ABSTRACT Attackers exploit vulnerabilities to change RET gadget chains and control the order of program execution, threatening the security of software implementations. For example, memory overflow attacks and remote shellcode attacks will lead to the leak of information. The previous key agreement protocols have not considered the security of protocol implementations at the source code level. As a result, when used on the networks (like wireless sensor networks, SAE/LTE networks, IOT networks, and cloud computing environment), they often suffer from vulnerabilities. To solve these problems, a novel key agreement protocol is proposed on the base of the RET gadget chain in this paper. The novel key agreement protocol not only considers the security of cryptographic techniques and the integrity of the control flow when executing programs, they can also prevent the attacks from the vulnerabilities during implementation at the source code level. At the same time, its security analysis and experiments conducted are presented in this paper. It has been shown in the experiments that the novel key agreement protocol can prevent code reuse attacks in the process of implementation at the source code level, and its performances (like time overheads and security) are better than those of other common key agreement protocols.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern society interacts with information and its development can't go without exchanging information on the Internet. Communicating information on the base of the Internet has given us comfort and convenience, but it has brought various risks, such as attacks from the Internet [1] and program vulnerabilities [2] . To guarantee receiving or sending information effectively and safely, information security techniques have been developed and utilized. Cryptography is one of the key techniques to protect information among them, and key agreement protocols are part of this field. Key agreement protocols have been exploited to ensure the security of information communication between entities, so they have been used widely on the networks (like wireless sensor networks, SAE/LTE network, IOT network and cloud computing environment) and other communication environments. In the process of information communication, key agreement protocols are exploited by entities to negotiate the shared key, authenticate their identity and protect their privacy.
In 1976, the famous Diffie-Hellman protocol [3] was proposed by Diffie and Hellman. It was the first time to generate shared keys on insecure public communication channels. Well-designed protocols protect privacy and secure information exchange online, so researchers have proposed many new key agreement protocols on the base of the Diffie-Hellman protocol. For example, famous key agreement protocols MTI series (A key recovery attack on discrete long-based schemes using a prime order subgroup, Authenticated multi-party key agreement and Cryptographic method and apparatus for public key exchange with authentication), MQV (Some new key agreement protocols providing implicit authentication), KEA (Key Exchange Agreement) and HMQV (HMQV:A high performance security Diffie Hellman protocol) improved the security of key agreement protocols theoretically. Now key agreement protocols have been widely used in various net environments to ensure the security of communication online. For example, they can be used to prevent these attacks: the attacks of wireless sensor networks, known session-specific temporary information attacks, offline password-guessing attacks using a stolen-smartcard, new-smartcard-issue attacks, and user-impersonation attacks. Wireless sensor networks can't use anonymity. To solve these problems, He et al. [4] proposed to anonymously preserving three-factor authenticated key exchange protocol for wireless sensor network. The flaws of Long Term Evolution lead to some vulnerabilities when the user access networks and authenticate their identity. Aimed at the insecurity of identity authentication on SAE/LTE, Degefa et al. [5] proposed a key agreement protocol to improve the performance and security of the authentication for SAE/LTE networks. On distributed networks, participators often leave or join groups, so the quantity of participators changes with time. The security of leaving and joining is influenced by backward confidentiality and forward confidentiality. As a result, when dynamic group key agreement protocols are used in the file sharing system, many problems arise, such as lacking privacy, violating availability and relying on key escrow. To avoid this situation, Ermiş et al. [6] proposed a key agreement protocol with partial backward confidentiality to strengthen the security of file sharing system. In the cloud computing environment, the identity authentication of users and key negotiation are critical factors. Some key agreement protocols are threatened by various vulnerabilities, like replay attacks, online dictionary and offline dictionary guessing attacks, denial of service attacks and man-in-the-middle attacks. Aiming at these problems, Chattaraj et al. [7] proposed a new scheme: two-server authentication and key agreement protocols for accessing secure cloud services. Hence, a well-designed key agreement protocol has been a focus in the field of information security [8] . Now great achievements can be found in the field of key agreement protocols [8] - [12] .
However, the security of protocols never only means the theoretical security considered from cryptographic techniques, for it can't guarantee the security of protocol implementations at the source code level. For example, although a protocol is proved to be secure theoretically, attackers can exploit buffer overflow during the process of executing the program codes to get the content of RET instructions and then control the order of program execution. That means that there exist leaks in the software and some information will be leaked. Therefore, the protocol implementations are not secure.
Attacks based on the RET returning addresses are malicious and very common. Key agreement protocols belong to software scope so that they also suffer from this kind of security problems. To resist the attacks from program leaks during implementing cryptographic protocols, a new key agreement protocol, based on the RET gadget (search for some short instruction sequences in the original code. These sequences can perform certain functions and end with the RET instruction) chains, is proposed in this paper. It can prevent the attacks from buffer overflow or skip when executing programs and then guarantee the security of protocol implementations at the source code level.
A. RELATED WORK
In the field of information security, a prominent problem that industry and academia focus on is that the vulnerabilities of computer programs bring threats to software. The causes are: x there are flaws in the software due to imperfect design; y There are flaws which come from the program languages. There are inherent flaws in some programs written in C, C++. For example, CPU instructions can access information directly from memory. C and C++ don't set mechanism to check bounds automatically for users' input and they can reuse free pointers [13] . These characteristics make it possible for programs to be attacked by vulnerabilities from memory overflow [14] , like Return-to-Libc attacks [15] , ROP (Return-Oriented Programming [16] ) attacks, JOP (JumpOriented-Programming [17] ) attacks. Researchers have proposed some methods to resist these attacks. For example, CFI (Control-flow Integrity) [18] was proposed to prevent programs from being controlled arbitrarily. ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomization) was proposed to randomize the pages, which are occupied by code segments and data segments, heaps and stacks in the process to prevent code reuse attacks. To prevent memory leaks and shellcode attacks, Crane et al. [19] proposed a method to strictly separate codes from data segments to ensure that code segments are only executed but can't be read. By exploiting cryptographic techniques, Mashtizadeh et al. [20] proposed CCFI (Cryptographically Control Flow Integrity). This method can prevent attackers from executing random codes in the vulnerable programs.
In fact, cryptographic protocols belong to software scope. A cryptographic protocol must be written in program languages and executed on a system to achieve its function. Since vulnerabilities bring threats to software, cryptographic protocols are also threatened by vulnerabilities [21] , [22] , such as, the famous attack event ''heart-bleed'' [23] and the session hijacking attack on physical layer key generation agreement [24] . When designing a key agreement protocol and analyzing its security, if researchers don't consider the security of the implementations at source code level, their key agreement protocols will suffer from the vulnerabilities when applied on the networks. For example, He et al. [4] , Degefa et al. [5] , Ermiş et al. [6] and Chattaraj et al. [7] improved original key agreement protocols. However, they didn't consider the security of the implementations of key agreement protocols at source code level, so they inevitably suffered from attacks from the networks, such as program vulnerabilities and remote shellcode attacks. On the other hand, cryptographic protocols have their own characteristics. For example, a basic requirement of cryptographic protocols is that at least two entities participate and authenticate their identity in the process of an interactive communication. Therefore, cryptographic protocol implementations at the source code level should be focused on.
B. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Although many researches (mentioned above) have been done to resist software vulnerabilities, few are aimed at the security of cryptographic protocol implementations at the source code level. When implementing a cryptographic protocol, it must be considered that the cryptographic protocol may suffer from the attacks due to software vulnerabilities. For example, when designing a cryptographic protocol, it is the key step to generate parameters randomly. Random numbers are vulnerable to the shellcode attacks because of memory overflow [25] . To solve this problem, we propose a novel key agreement protocol basing on RET gadget chains generated during the process of implementations at the source code level. It can prevent memory overflow and resist the attacks of program execution jump so as to guarantee the security of implementations.
Our contributions:
x considering the secure factors of its implementations at the source code level when designing a cryptographic protocol, such as memory overflow and program execution jump.
y improving a novel key agreement protocol on the base of the security of implementing at the source code level.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In order to illustrate controlling program attacks clearly, it is necessary to explain the basic related knowledge: x the allocation of registers; y the organizational process of memory; z the operation of calling functions (CALL) and returning their address(RET); { vulnerabilities caused memory overflow.
A. THE ALLOCATION OF REGISTERS 1) GENERAL REGISTERS IN CPU
In the computer system structures, CPU is the control center of program execution. The memorizers directly connecting CPU are the registers that operate fast. In Table 1 are some registers and their functions.
2) THE ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESS OF MEMORY
Memory is one of the major components of computer system structures. Its main function is to store information so it plays an important part when running computers. From the perspective of operating system, a process is an activity that happens when a program and its data are executed orderly on the CPU. Therefore, processes and data are directly associated with the allocation of memory. To clearly see how memory changes when running a program, it is necessary to know how a process organizes the memory. As is shown in literature [14] , memory allocation has 3 zones: texts, data and stacks, shown in Figure 1 . If the organization process of registers and memory are clearly monitored, protocol implementations at the source code level can be dynamically monitored. This can be exploited to discover the vulnerabilities from programs.
B. THE OPERATION OF CALLING FUNCTIONS (CALL) AND RETURNING THEIR ADDRESS (RET) 1) QUEUE AND STACKS OF PROGRAM EXECUTION
When executing programs, computer system structures introduce two types of data memorizing structures to store temporary values when running programs: one is stack, whose characteristic is LIFO. Another is queue, whose characteristic is FIFO. In the assembly language, stacks are often operated: PUSH and POP.
2) CALL AND RET OF PROGRAM EXECUTION
Among the execution instructions of assembly language programs, CALL and RET are two important ones. Attackers can obtain the contents of CALL and RET through program vulnerabilities. x The CALL instruction: when executing this instruction, the return address of calling subprograms is stored into stacks so that the subprograms can use it when returning. After that, the execution jumps to the entry address of the subprograms to continue executing programs; y The RET instruction: generally, the RET instruction is placed at the end of the subprograms. When a subprogram finishes its execution, the program execution returns calling programs to continue its execution. The return address is stored into stacks when executing the CALL instruction. The function of RET is to pop the return address and push it into EIP registers and CS registers. A simple execution of C language program and its assembly codes are taken as examples to show the concrete process of calling (CALL) and returning (RET), shown in Figure 2 . On the left are C language codes and on the right are assembly language codes going through GDB debugging.
As is shown in Figure 2 , the CALL instruction and the RET instruction occur in pairs. The content of the RET instruction is next to the CALL instruction. Therefore, attackers can obtain the content of the RET instruction through vulnerabilities, and then control the order of program execution.
C. VULNERABILITIES CAUSED BY MEMORY OVERFLOW
A serious problem that software security is faced with is that memory overflow causes vulnerabilities. It is necessary to prevent this kind of attacks. Let's see how memory overflow causes vulnerabilities.
When too many data are stored in the memory buffer, some will be covered by other data due to the limited space. This situation is called memory overflow. For example, the data stored in RET are covered so that the data delivered to EIP are not the data from the previous return address. Then program execution generates abnormal behaviors, which generates vulnerabilities. Here is a simple example illustrating how the RET data zone is covered, shown in Figure 3 . On the left are C language codes and their execution, and on the right is memory overflow. VOLUME 6, 2018 Shown in Figure 3 , the RET zone is covered by AAAA. When subprograms return calling programs and the content from RET arrives at EIP, the execution can't continue because AAAA isn't a legal address. Hence, memory overflow problem arises.
There are 3 types of common attacks that control the order of the program execution through memory overflow.
x Return-to-Libc attack: if attackers know the address of library functions used by programs, they can cover certain function return values in the program with other addresses. In this way, attackers can exploit any parameter to call any library functions in the memory; y ROP attack: it is closely related to calling functions and returning mechanism. In the 80x86 framework programs, when executing the CALL instruction, CPU will set the address, which is an instruction next to the CALL instruction, as the returning address, and the execution will jump to the location instructed by CALL. When executing the RET instruction, CPU will automatically send the return address stored in the stacks to EIP registers, and then execute the instruction next to the CALL instruction. But this operation will not check or guarantee their correctness. This flaw will be exploited by the ROP attacks. z JOP attack: it exploits gadget chains to attack, which is similar to ROP, but it doesn't rely on stacks to control program flows. More knowledge related to this can be found in literatures [26] , [27] .
III. THE NEW KEY AGREEMENT PROTOCOL
A key agreement protocol requires that two or more participants provide respective information to generate a shared key. Generally, the participants of a protocol can't decide the shared key in advance alone. In this paper, the conceptions, the ideal communication environment and the ideal communication channel, are proposed in a new key agreement protocol on the base of RET gadget chains.
A. BASIC KNOWLEDGE
1) BASIC DEFINITION Definition 1 (Ideal Communication Environment): An ideal communication environment must satisfy the following conditions: x there are no communication environments under Dolev-Yao model assumption (That is, there are no adversary attacks in an ideal communication environment, such as passive attacks or active attacks); y all the participants of a protocol are honest; z the information sent or received by the participants is protected and read by encrypting and decrypting techniques. Definition 2 (Ideal Communication Channel): When the participants of a protocol communicate in an ideal environment, their communication channels are called ideal communication channels.
2) FLA (FUNCTION LABELED ALGORITHM)
The design of the new key agreement protocol of this paper considers the protocol implementations at the source code level. There is a space explosion problem in a program execution. To avoid this problem, Function-labeled Algorithm is applied. As a result, our new key agreement protocol is secure and practical. The algorithm 1 is shown in Figure 4 . In the communication of the new key agreement protocol, ID A and ID B respectively denote the identification of two participants of the protocol. According to the program execution instruction rules of assembly languages, Ret A and Ret B respectively denote the gadget set of the RET instructions in the process of implementing the key agreement protocol at source code level in a non-ideal communication channel, called non-ideal gadget chains. That is, Ret A = {ret a1 , ret a2 , ..., ret an }, n ∈ N and Ret B = {ret b1 , ret b2 , ..., ret bk }, k ∈ N . Here, ret ai denotes the RET gadget of the ith functions related to the new key agreement protocol during the process of implementing the source codes of the protocol participant A. ret bi denotes the RET gadget of the ith functions related to the new key agreement protocol during the process of implementing the source codes of the protocol participant B. Ret IA and Ret IB respectively denotes the gadget chains of function RET instructions generated when implementing the key agreement protocol at the source code level in the ideal communication channels, called ideal gadget chains. That is, Ret IA = {ret ia1 , ret ia2 , ..., ret iam }, m ∈ N and Ret IB = {ret ib1 , ret ib2 , ..., ret ibk }, k ∈ N . (5) and (6) are true at the same time, the participants (A and B) of the communication generate a shared key k ab = g xy modn.
2) THE NEW KEY AGREEMENT PROTOCOL
The new key agreement protocol exploits gadget chains, the identity information of the protocol's participants and other information to guarantee its correct implementations at the source code level through Hash value signatures. If an implementation of the new key agreement protocol is correct, its participants will negotiate and reach a shared key. The detailed security analysis of the new key agreement protocol will be presented in section 4.
IV. THE SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE NEW PROTOCOL
The new key agreement protocol is designed on the base of Diffie-Hellman protocol, taking it into consideration that the protocol may be attacked by vulnerabilities in the process of its implementations at the source code level. Therefore, when analyzing the security of the new key agreement protocol, two situations are considered: x the security analysis based on cryptography theory; y the security analysis of implementations at the source code level.
A. THE SECURITY ANALYSIS BASED ON CRYPTOGRAPHY THEORY
The identifying labels ID of the participants are added into the interactive communication of the new key agreement protocol. The authentication of two participants is verified through one-way Hash signature. At the same time, the security of the new key agreement protocol can be reduced to discrete logarithm problems: let y ∈ G, calculate x ∈ Z * q , and then y = g x (or x = log g y). Therefore, it satisfies the VOLUME 6, 2018
Decision of Diffie-Hellman protocol, called DDH(Decision Diffie-Hellman) problem [28] .
The Decision of Diffie-Hellman Problem : to arbitrary integers a, b, c ∈ Z * q , given < g, g a , g b , g c >, the difficulty of deciding c = abmodn is equivalent to solving discrete logarithms. That is, there exists a PPT (Probability polynomial time) algorithm C, so that Pr
Here, ε(n) is probability and can be ignored.
The new key agreement protocol authenticates the identification of the communication's participants through Hash value signature and RET gadgets are fresh. Hence, with forward security, the new key agreement protocol can satisfy fundamental assumption of Diffie-Hellman protocol and resist man-in-the-middle attacks.
B. THE SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION BASED ON STRAND SPACE
The behavior of controlling the arbitrary program execution will result in the insecurity of a key agreement protocol. When implementing a key agreement protocol at the source code level, it is necessary to consider the order of sending and receiving messages of the participants, as well as the calling of functions during running programs. Therefore, in this paper the analysis method of strand space [29] is applied when analyzing the security of the new key agreement protocol. A directed diagraph is presented in Figure 6 . Due to the limited length of this paper, only fundamental knowledge related to strand space is presented in the following. Figure 6 , when implementing the new key agreement protocol, if the order relation ≺ R of sender's and receiver 's massages satisfies reflexivity, asymmetry and transmissibility, (M, ≺ R ) is a partially ordered set.
1) THE FUNDAMENTAL KNOWLEDGE OF STRAND SPACE

Shown in
Lemma 1 if massage set M is non-empty, there exists a unique minimal element over the partially ordered set (M, ≺ R ).
Proof: Given that M is a message set of the sender and the receiver of participants, (M, ≺ R ) is a partially ordered set, and there exists the longest chain of the sender and the receiver in M. Let M = {m 1 , m 2 , ..., m i , ..., m n }:
(1) Existence Given that M = {m 1 , m 2 , ..., m i , ..., m n } is the longest message chain of the sender and the receiver over a partially ordered set (M, ≺ R ), there exist ∃m y ∈ M and ∀m x ∈ M . Then m y ≺ R m x is true. Otherwise, it is not true that M is the longest chain; (2) Uniqueness Let m y , m y ∈ M be minimal elements over a partially ordered set (M, ≺ R ). When ∀m x ∈ M , there existm y ≺ R m x and m y ≺ R m x . If m y = m y , it is contradictory that M is the longest chain. As a result, m y = m y . That is, the minimal element is unique.
Definition 3 (The Security Attribute of Strand Space):
When implementing a key agreement protocol at the source code level, if the order relation of its participants' sending and receiving messages satisfies strict partially ordered relation, the order relation of sending and receiving messages has the following security attributes in strand space:
(1) (The uniqueness of the minimal element): When executing the programs of the protocol, the minimal element of ≺ R is unique, otherwise the protocol is insecure;
(2) (Strong consistency): The participants of the protocol authenticate each other's identification by using a special element − → x . − → x is unique, otherwise the design of the protocol has flaws.
(3) (Confidentiality): There is not any secret message msg (like random numbers, temporary values) sent through insecure channels without being protected. msg is secret, otherwise there are vulnerabilities in the protocol.
2) THE SECURITY VERIFICATION BASED ON STRAND SPACE
In this paper, the adversary model is exploited to verify whether the new key agreement can resist the attacks due to changing the RET gadgets when running its programs. Let adversaries have the capability under the Dolev-Yao model, the capability to change the RET gadgets to attack (like Return-to-Libc attack, ROP attack and JOP attack) and the capability to exploit system vulnerabilities to execute remote attacks (shellcode attacks).
(1) Under the Dolev-Yao model, the new key agreement protocol can resist man-in-the-middle attacks and possesses forward security.
(2) Let the following insecure events happen if adversaries change the RET gadgets (Ret attack ) of called functions when implementing the protocol at the source code level.
x If signature fails (Hash(ID B ||Ret IB ||g y modn} = σ B and Hash(ID A ||Ret IA ||g x modn} = σ A ), as is illustrated in e)and f) of section 3.2, the protocol will terminate generating shared keys. That is, the strong-consistence security of strand space can't be satisfied.
y If Ret attack is compared with Ret IA , and Ret attack is compared with Ret IB , the participants of the protocol A or B can discover that the attacks in the process of implementation are due to changing the RET gadgets of called functions.
z Taking Figure 6 as an example, when executing programs, it will occur that the order of {+{Sig(ID A || Ret A ||g x modn)||g x modn} ≺ R −{Sig(ID A ||Ret A ||g x modn)|| g x modn} ≺ R +{Sig(ID B ||Ret B ||g y modn)||g y modn} ≺ R −{Sig(ID B ||Ret B ||g y modn)||g y modn}} is not unique. That is, there exists a non-unique minimal element.
{ As is illustrated in e) and d) of section III, if random numbers x and y in the communication of the new key agreement protocol are leaked, the secret information will not be protected. That is, the leak of x or y will cause the case that the new key agreement protocol can't satisfy the assumptions of DDH.
When executing programs, changing the RET gadgets of called functions will cause many attacks. When designing our new key agreement protocol, the security of protocol implementations at the source code level is taken into consideration, which makes up the imperfection of the previous design of key agreement protocols.
V. EXPERIMENTS AND PERFOMANCE ANALYSIS
The new key agreement protocol is designed on the base of the function return address set (called RET gadget chains) generated in its implementations at the source code level. Experiments are carried out to prove the security and the superiority of our new key agreement protocol. The experiment environment: Linux operating system, CPU Intel(R) Core i7 and open source OpenSSL. Written in C language, the new key agreement protocol is implemented through C/S pattern and its participants communicate by using the SOCKET interface of TCP.
A. THE CHANGE OF RET GADGET CHAINS
Code reuse is exploited to attack the new key agreement protocol. The EIP values of RET instructions are changed to evaluate whether the new key agreement protocol can resist common code reuse attacks(like Ret-to-libc, ReturnOriented Programming, Jump-Oriented Programming). The experiment steps are:
(1) Write the codes of the new key agreement protocol and gain RET values:
x write the codes of client.c and server.c in C language; y exploit FLA algorithm to label the functions associating with the implementations of the new key agreement protocol at the source code level in client.c and server.c; z gain the RET instruction values of labeled functions by using the inline assembly's macro definition #define EIP() ({unsigned int p;__asm__(''1: mov 1b,%%rax; shr $32,%%rax;movl %%eax,%0'':''=r''(p)::''%eax'');p;)}); { in Linux environments, use GCC to compile client.c and server.c and transfer them into executable files client and server.
(2) In an assumptive ideal environment, run client and server in Linux environment. After that, gain the ideal RET gadget chains Ret TA = {Ret 1 , · · · , Ret i · · · Ret n |i, n ∈ N }. 
B. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
Security and overhead of time are two main criteria to evaluate key agreement protocols. In practice, it is difficult for key agreement protocols to balance security and overhead of time. As is often the case, the safer a key agreement protocol is, the more the overhead of time it needs, verse visa. The security and the overhead of time of the new key agreement protocol are analyzed in the following.
1) SECURITY COMPARISON
The security of the new key agreement protocol is compared with that of common authentication and signature key agreement protocols [30] , [31] . Y denotes that the protocol can achieve the item and N denotes the protocol can't achieve the item in the process of implementations at source code level.
Shown in Table 2 , the new key agreement protocol can resist common code reuse attacks, but other authentication and signature key agreement protocols can' t.
2) OVERHEAD OF TIME COMPARISON
The overhead of time of the new key agreement protocol is compared with that of common authentication and signature key agreement protocols. For clear elaboration, A and B are respectively used to denote client and server. o(2 n ) denotes unit time of the exponential with base number g, h denotes the overhead of Hash calculation, shown in Table 3 . Table 3 our new scheme uses less overhead of time at theoretical level than other key agreement protocols. It shows that our new key agreement protocol is superior in theory. Besides, we have conducted experiments to compare the overhead of time used in the process of implementations at the source code level, shown in Table 4 .
3) PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
Shown in
Shown in Table 4 , in the process of implementation at the source code level, our new key agreement protocol needs less overhead of time than other protocols. Although our scheme applies Hash value signature to decide whether the RET gadget chain is integral, the overhead of time for Hash computation is very small because the calculation of chosen Hash is light. For example, only 2.38×10 −4 second is needed when calculating the binary Hash value of 2048. Therefore, the overhead of time for Hash value can be ignored. For clearly comparing the overhead of time used by these protocols in the process of implementations, Figure 7 is drawn as following.
From Figure. 7, when the bits are small, the difference between our new protocol and other 3 protocols is small. However, when bits are big, the difference is very big.
Besides, the curve of MQV is covered by that of HMQV in Figure. 7. The curve of MQV is showed in Figure. 8 alone. It shows that although HMQV uses Hash value signature, which made it safer than MQV, there is little difference between the overhead of time used by HMQV and that used by MQV.
In summary, our new key agreement protocol can detect and monitor buffer overflow and abnormal behaviors of program order execution in the process of implementations, and resist common code reuse attacks and remote shellcode injection attacks. That guarantees the secure implementations of our new key agreement protocol at source code level. Besides, our new key agreement protocol needs much less overhead of time than other key agreement protocols. Therefore, it can be applied to the communication devices with limited capability, especially mobile communication devices.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
It has been important to design a perfect key agreement protocol. Now there are a lot of well-designed key agreement protocols. Those protocols consider the security of cryptographic techniques, such as difficult mathematics problems, undistinguishable probability. However, they don't consider the flaws of program languages and the security of protocol implementations at the source code level. In order to solve these problems above, we propose to decide the security of a protocol from its program execution and exploit RET gadget chains to improve present key agreement protocols. The new key agreement protocol in this paper is secure in the implementations at the source code level. In the experiment, the security is analyzed and the overhead of time of our new protocol is compared with that of other protocols. It has shown that the new key agreement protocol can resist common cryptographic technique attacks and prevent common code reuse attacks from the changed RET gadgets in the process of implementations. At the same time, the new key agreement protocol, with small calculation, can apply to communication devices with limited calculation capability, especially mobile communication devices.
Future work should be focused on: x the implementation security of key agreement protocols of software, for example fine-grained discovery of the vulnerabilities in the software's protocols of mobile communication devices [32] ; y designing new key agreement protocols or improving present ones on the base of security techniques against software vulnerabilities; z the security of concurrent protocol implementations at the source code level in the distributed system. WU FUSHENG received the Ph.D. degree in computer science from Wuhan University, China, in 2018. His main research interests include cryptographic protocols, system security, and secure analysis of cryptographic protocols code.
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